Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Australian Counter Terrorism Conference

Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events

12-4-2013

Twitter Influence and Cumulative Perceptions of Extremist
Support: A Case Study of Geert Wilders
Gabrielle Blanquart
Edith Cowan University

David M. Cook
Edith Cowan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/act
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
DOI: 10.5072/73/579718df55b02
4th Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia, 2nd-4th December,
2013
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/act/22

TWITTER INFLUENCE AND CUMULATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF EXTREMIST SUPPORT: A CASE
STUDY OF GEERT WILDERS
1

2

Gabrielle Blanquart , David M. Cook
School of Computer and Security Science1, Security Research Institute2
Edith Cowan University, Perth, Australia
gblanqua@our.ecu.edu.au, d.cook@ecu.edu.au

Abstract
The advent of Social media has changed the manner in which perceptions about power and
information can be influenced. Twitter is used as a fast‐paced vehicle to deliver short, succinct pieces
of information, creating the perception of acceptance, popularity and authority. In the case of
extremist groups, Twitter is one of several avenues to create the perception of endorsement of values
that would otherwise gain less prominence through mainstream media. This study examines the use
of Twitter in augmenting the status and reputation of anti‐Islam and anti‐immigration policy through
the controlled release of social media information bursts. The paper demonstrates the use of new
media by extremist groups using open source case study data from the associated Twitter traffic of
Geert Wilders. The results indicate the pursuit of increased traction for controversial ideals that
provoke and incite others towards extremism, violence, racism and Islamaphobia.
Keywords
Twitter, Extremism, New Media, Geert Wilders, Radicalisation, Anti‐immigration, Metadata,
Homophily.
BACKGROUND
The History and Influence of Twitter
Created in 2006, Twitter is an online micro‐blogging service that allows users to send and receive 140
character ‘bursts’ of information known as ‘Tweets’ (Lloyd, 2012). The Twitter organisation claims to
have over 200 million users (Twitter, 2013), and there is widespread evidence that the number of
users has grown rapidly (Parmelee&Bichard, 2013). Twitter is available in 58 countries in 37
languages (Twitter, 2013) and is the second most popular social media vehicle in the world (MIT,
2013).
Compared to social media mainstays LinkedIn and Facebook, Twitter is significantly under‐moderated
(Dean et al., 2012), whilst Twitter’s message content has a greater rate of diffusion
(Ausserhofer&Maireder, 2013;Rovner, 2013). Twitter sends short ‘tweets’ of information, the power
of which is multiplied each time the original message is re‐tweeted (Parmelee&Bichard, 2013). Thus
an original tweet may be judged as influential based upon the number of followers who choose to
re‐tweet the original message to their network of connections (KLOUT, 2013; Twitter, 2013).
The Internet is a ubiquitous assembly of information networks (Chen, 2010; Keeves, 2012) and
Twitter represents a substantial portion of those networks (Tapscott& Williams, 2008). The growth
and direction of Twitter indicates that it now stands as an independently strong organisation that
facilitates the dispersion of ideas more directly than competing new media (Parmelee&Bichard,
2013; Schneier, 2012). Twitter exhibits significant influence over political campaigns, issues and
authority in both information and misinformation (Chamberlain, 2010; Schneier, 2012). New media
such as Twitter now delivers measurable and recordable degrees of influence across a range of
contestable issues (Park & Lee, 2009; Parmelee&Bichard, 2013). This paper will use a case study of
the 12 month Twitter activity of Dutch political extremist Geert Wilders in order to illustrate the
manner in which twitter messaging can directly facilitate incitement, provocation and violent
reactions.
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The Mechanics of Twitter
Twitter is built upon an open source software platform (Twitter, 2013). It is an abbreviated form of
messaging based on high‐speed dissemination rather than multi‐layered social integration
(Parmelee&Bichard, 2013). The two key components of Twitter are the Direct Messages (DMs) and
the Re‐tweeted messages (RTs). The multiplier effect of RTs more clearly determine influence since
they offer measurability of the sway, power and authority of information diffusion through
technology (Romero, Wojciech, Asur, and Huberman, 2011). The difference between DMs and RTs is
highlighted by the increased power of RTs. For example, if a politician with extremist views tweets a
direct message (DM) to 5000 followers, then it gives an indication of his popularity within his political
domain, However if the same message is subsequently re‐tweeted (RT) to a further 15000 personas
and then on to another 10000 personas, a more reliable indication of influence begins to emerge.
Since retweeted messages deliver exponential growth in message diffusion, a message that is re‐
distributed signals an increase in the influence of the content of that message (Rogers, 2003). Thus
the propagation of tweets determines influence far more clearly than the instigation of each tweet
by its original author (Romero et al, 2011).
Social media advocates claim increased social inclusion using technology allows for a higher level of
transparency and openness (Winn and Zakem 2009). Simultaneously, it also allows those with the
digital understanding and technological means to harness the social inclusivity of the wider populace
(Buck, Buck, &Mogil, 2003; Walker, 2009). In combination with Twitter’s lack of moderation, the
increased speed of diffusion makes Twitter a far more usable proposition for extremist groups who
become aware of limitations in other forms of new media (Dean et al, 2012). Where Facebook and
Youtube display narrative and counter‐narrative, Twitter’s short, sharp messages have a far more
galvanising effect upon followers. It allows minority voices to shout considerably louder on their
political landscapes, including the voices of fanatics, extremists and those seeking to incite
discrimination and hatred toward others (Jackson, 2009).
Re‐tweetability and Influence
The key to the successful propagation of information diffusion through Twitter is the ‘re‐tweetability’
of each narrative. The key force‐multipliers (factors that increase multiple re‐tweets) that affect
twitter are keywords, @username, hashtags, and URLs (Suh, Lichan, Pirolli, & Chi, 2010). Keywords
that resonate with audiences that are already predisposed to certain messages allow extremist
ideology and dogma to promulgate. The @username metadata is embedded in the standard re‐
tweet functionality, meaning RTs repeatedly promote the original author (Yang & Counts, 2010). The
use of URLs and hashtags has greater multiplying effects. They form the principle markers that
followers will look for when deciding to re‐tweet a message (Yang et al, 2010). Hashtag metadata
(such as #Stop Islam) gains popular usage among anti‐immigration and anti‐Islamic extremist groups,
often being added to semi‐related tweets to leverage analogous thinking. This tactic amongst like‐
minded followers is referred to as homophily (Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010). Followers who see
the hashtag will respond by re‐tweeting the hashtag, often as a call to action (Suh et al, 2010; Kwak,
et al, 2010). Similarly, URLs that point to related news or in many cases images are also suitable
metadata tools that popularize and promote each message more powerfully than the narrative in its
raw text‐only form (Suh et al, 2010).
HOW TWITTER INFLUENCES EXTREMISM
Web 2.0 technology now underpins most contemporary extremist operations, enabling finance,
recruitment, and general support (Dean et al, 2012; Halverson & Way, 2012; Porter & Kebbell, 2011;
Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Torok, 2013). Dean et al (2012) and Torok (2013) posit that this more
increasingly involves social media sites such as Youtube, Twitter and Facebook. Extremist groups are
more often deploying online social media proliferation as recruitment and training tools, as opposed
to traditional face to face interactions (Bell et al, 2012; Shirazi, 2012; Torok, 2013). The increased use
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of the internet by extremists through social media as a new mechanism for engagement has
magnified the availability of radical ideas (Dean et al, 2012; Shirazi, 2012; Torok, 2013). The value of
new media to extremists is that it can be harnessed at relatively low cost for the purposes of building
a perception of a greatly exaggerated social capital (Conway, 2012). Such social capital can be
converted into tolerance, support, acceptance, and mobilisation towards extremist ideology
(Warschauer, 2003). The case of Arid Uka illustrates the trend of lone‐wolf radicalization through the
online environment with no affiliations (Torok, 2013).
Reinforcing Extremist Policies and Beliefs
An alluring feature of Twitter is it’s homophily, where like‐minded individuals join networks and
normalise views and behaviours, often reinforcing extremist policy (Stevens & Neumann, 2009). As a
person changes their views and becomes radicalized, the role of the internet changes from a source
of information to a reinforcement tool (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Online Web 2.0 participants seek other
online users who have similar beliefs, and corroboration on beliefs can amplify the extremity of that
belief (Stevens & Neumann, 2009; Torok, 2013). New media can reinforce extremist beliefs by
spreading disinformation, hateful language or horrific images and encourage the creation of out‐
groups, reinforcing the categorical thinking that pushes an extremist to take action towards others
(Conway 2007; Conway, 2012; Moghaddam, 2007). Both Holtmann, (2013), and Kundani (2012)
acknowledge the danger of ‘cumulative extremism’ from vehicles such as Twitter through narrative
exchanges that focus on fear and retaliation as common themes for discussion. Twitter can re‐
enforce extremist policies as Tweets allow authors to send information without explanation and
directly control perception, thus assisting extremists to transmit dogma without the accompanying
reasoning (Conway 2007;2012). Gleason (2013) attributes the popularity of Twitter to this
attractiveness of brevity.
Radicalization of followers
There are many intermediary influences by which an individual or group may be radicalised (Aly
&Streigher, 2012; Schmid, 2013; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). A growing practice for recruiting members
relies on new media as an avenue for radicalising disenfranchised individuals (Bell et al, 2012;
Shirazi, 2012). The way extremists use new media such as Twitter demonstrates the vulnerability for
increased recruitment and extremism to proliferate (Helmus et al, 2013; Porter &Kebbell, 2011;
Sutton & Wright, 2009). According to Silber & Bhatt’s (2007) report, the internet acts as an
accelerant to extremism and creates the ultimate path of radicalization. Homophily evolves as like‐
minded people share extremist thoughts, group polarization grows from compatible dialogue
(Stevens & Neumann, 2009) Gleason (2013) posits that Twitter is utilized to fulfill cursory interest
where it provides informal, constructivist learning regarding a topic and provides an informal space
that facilitates opportunities to construct knowledge from multiple modalities including user‐
generated content. Recent scholarly interest in how Twitter can inform and mobilise people in times
of social unrest suggests that Twitter provides a direct platform for social participation and can
facilitate ‘calls to action’ through both encouraging displacement of aggression and through an
ability to contact a group directly (Conway, 2012; Gleason, 2013; Lotan et al, 2010; Tufeki, 2012).
GEERT WILDERS: A CASE STUDY OF TWITTER BEHAVIOUR
Right‐Wing Extremist and the European Movement
Dutch politician Geert Wilders advocates a far‐right ideology based on anti‐Islam, and anti‐
immigration platforms specifically directed at Europe. He has over 283,000 Twitter followers
(Twitter, 2013). He uses Twitter regularly, and posts inflammatory, anti‐Islamic content on Twitter as
a method to arouse support. Wilders’ aims to create international alliances against immigration and
Sharia law in the western world (Conway, 2012; Switzer, 2010). Wilders is portrayed as an anti‐Islam
figurehead for national populist groups with a network of supporters internationally and throughout
the EU (Vossen, 2011; Van der Zwan, 2011). Right wing political figures such as Wilders focus on
Islam as extremist and undesirable, and going against traditional western liberal values (Acuto, 2010;
3

Bartlett et al, 2011).He has been taken to court for hateful language towards Muslim people
(Bartlett et al, 2011) and was refused entry into the United Kingdom in 2009 (Independent, 2009).
Geert Wilders’ twitter accounts align with other far‐right wing movements that are emerging
through Europe. His twitter‐fed ideology appears overtly discriminatory and draws from current
political and social problems as well as official security narratives and jihadist narratives (Kundani,
2012; Ramalingam et al, 2012; Stevens & Neumann, 2009). The active support (via re‐tweets) for
Wilders’ extremist messages, over 10,000 re‐tweets (between 2012 and 2013), gives rise to concern
in terms of right wing radical support in Europe. The number of followers who retain direct
connectivity to Wilders’ twitter messages is a stark indicator of influence and support. Encouraged
mobilisation and calls to action include street based activism, participation in parliament to possible
violence. Euphemistic narratives such as #stop Islam are open to interpretation. Whilst right‐wing
extremism is underestimated next to the global Islamist threat which has characterised most
counter terrorism efforts (Kundani, 2012; Richards, 2013; Tepfenhart, 2011), Wilders’ tweets
resonate strongly with other right‐wing groups. An analysis of Geert Wilders’ Twitter practices
substantiates the challenges driven by extremism and new media.
The Language of Twitter: Using Hateful Commentary to stir reaction
For two decades a wave of far right extremism has evolved through Europe, based on the opposition
to cultural pluralism stemming from mass immigration (Bartlett et al, 2011; Tepfenhart, 2011). Far‐
right discourses include the protectionism of national identity, anti‐immigration, and concerns over
multiculturalism and Islamic extremism (Bartlett et al, 2011; Richards, 2013). Specialised and
understated language, as identified by Bandura (2004), is an important tactic for extremists, and
Wilders’ content on Twitter uses terms that draw on popular themes and areas of dissatisfaction and
disenfranchisement (Kundani, 2012). Such language gains support and inspires others towards his
ideology (Bartlett et al, 2011; Kundani, 2012). Table 1 provides examples of the characteristic
language used by Wilders on Twitter.

Table 1. Samples of Geert Wilders Tweets @geertwilderspvv

The Twitter Commentary of Geert Wilders, a focus on inciting hatred in Muslims
An analysis of Geert Wilders’ two main twitter accounts (@geertwilderspvv and @geertwilders_mp)
from January 2012 to September 2013 examined 459 tweets. The sample was collected from open
source content, available by following the accounts through Twitter.com. An examination of the
Twitter accounts between January 2012 and September 2013 indicates that Wilders’ most circulated
subject‐matter frequently critiqued the European Union (EU), and the current political
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establishment. National political content consisted of 43% and international political content 23% as
shown in Figure 1 and 2. Beyond these anti‐establishment jibes and taunts, the remaining Wilders’
tweets proffer anti‐Islamic sentiment. Of the 459 tweets, 87 were anti‐Islamic (19% of all tweets).
Wilders’ extremist narratives are mixed into the political commentary, they frequently transmit
scare stories, and inflammatory rhetoric depicting all Muslims as violent and that Islam equates to
War (see Table 1.).
Wilders’ narratives draw parallels with current new right extremists (Kundani, 2012) such as the EDL.
Wilders uses twitter to promote anti‐Islam ideology throughout Europe by aligning and promoting
the fear of terrorist threats from Muslims throughout Europe. Anti‐immigration rhetoric is blurred
with anti‐Islam rhetoric, and cross multiplied through thousands of retweets and their associated
narrative progeny.

Figure 1. Analysis of Tweet Topics 2012 to September 2013 disseminated by @geertwilderspvv

The categorisation of the key narratives depicted in Figure 1 (and further segmented in Table 2)
shows that Wilders tweeted many mainstream political messages in addition to his extremist
narratives. The mixture of political commentary and extremist commentary appears to lend populist
credibility to his contentious narratives. This in turn translates to a higher than expected number of
retweets of his extremist words. Twitter followers of Geert Wilders demonstrate acceptance and
support for a variety of topics even though nearly 20% of these messages cover extremist subject
matter.

Table2. Segmentation of Tweet Topics 2012 to September 2013 disseminated by @geertwilderspvv

The narrative segmentation (in Table 2) shows the number of tweets that were of a general political
nature and the number of tweets that are extremist. At first glance Geert Wilders twitter accounts
display sufficient personal content to humanise his narratives within normal social boundaries. If the
narratives of hateful, anti‐immigration, anti‐multicultural, anti‐establishment, anti‐Islam and Islamic
terror generalisations are summed up it can be seen that a three way segmentation of Personal
narratives (14.7%), Extremist narratives (26.4%), and 58.9% Political narratives (Table 2a) are
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created. Thus, the Twitter chronicles of Geert Wilder display the normal interactions of an active
public figure, but with the added characteristic that more than one quarter of all narratives
stimulates extremist discourse.

Table2a. Segmentation of Tweet Topics 2012 to September 2013 disseminated by @geertwilderspvv

The data in Table 3 gives an understanding of the influence of Geert Wilders’ extremist tweets, and
what types of narratives resonate with others. The table shows the number of retweets each of
Geert Wilders’ original tweets attracts. Wilders’ May 22nd 2013 post attracted 776 retweets.
Retweeted circulation delivered increased homophily (common pairings between like‐minded
twitter users) between followers and non‐followers. The May 22nd tweet re‐enforces Wilders’
persistent themes:
“Islam is war. Islam is violence. Islam Sharia. Islam is jihad. Why do we import it? # stop Islam”
The tweet coincided with the news that London soldier Lee Rigby had been hacked to death by two
individuals in an Islamic extremist attack (BBC, 2013). The attack received worldwide media
attention and resulted in far right groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) mobilizing
(Vinograd, 2013).
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Table 3. Geert Wilders Anti‐Islam tweets that were re‐tweeted from July 2012 to August 2013

The language of the tweets in Table 3 make generalisations about the Muslim faith using extremist
examples, propagating scare stories and promoting an anti‐immigration message. The May 22nd
tweet provides a homophile connection to similar tweets from other extremist groups and
individuals in the UK, most notably from the EDL.
Use of metadata
Wilders’ May 22nd tweet contains a call to action (stop Islam) in combination with the increased
impact provided by the hashtag. Thus the influence and authority of the message “hashtag
#stopislam” is greater than other messages about preventing Islam. The Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti‐
Muslim Attacks) group commented on the impact of these combined tweets against Muslims, citing
that that in the immediate aftermath of Lee Rigby’s death there were 212 incidents of extremist
retaliation towards UK Muslims within a period of one week (Elgot, 2013). Geert Wilders is one of
several high profile people who generated significant twitter reaction through his related metadata
and euphemistic narrative. His May 22nd tweet represents one his most popular messages using
twitter. Significant postings by Wilders use metadata in the form of hashtags and URLs to magnify
the propagation and diffusion of anti‐Islamic and anti‐immigration sentiment. The inclusion of a call
to action #stop Islam that has been embedded into a hashtag generates greater influence than had
Wilders posted without the hashtag. The use of these combined features strengthens the extremist
impact.
The tweets of the 17th and 18th of May use URLs to augment the re‐tweetability of the narrative
content. The 17th May tweet contains URL http://nos.nl/artikel/508118‐in‐deel‐schilderswijk‐is‐
sharia‐wet.html to a Dutch news feed, while 18th May tweet has the URL to newspaper De Telegraaf
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/21576797/WildersnaarSharia‐driehoek.html.
Of
Wilders’
extremist narratives, 26% use hashtags, whilst 77% use URLs. A further 5% use some form of ‘call to
action’ with anti‐immigration and anti‐Islamic directives. Geert Wilders also uses URL links to
pictures to entice extended tweet propagation via the pic.twitter.com functionality of twitter
pic.twitter.com/yMqgo0GoTa. Twitter pictures feature in more than 4% of his extremist tweets.
Geert Wilders uses extensive metatagging through the use of hashtags, URL links and twitter
pictures as a means of extending extremist narrative to an extended new media audience.
CONCLUSION
Twitter provides extremist groups with increased opportunities to magnify and heighten the
influence of their message. Twitter provides unrestrained access to information, reduced
communication costs, and enables the dissemination of automated homophily. It provides like‐
minded extremists with a lowered threshold for engaging in behaviour outside of the social norm
(Dean et al, 2012; Neumann, 2009). Twitter is under‐moderated, yet disseminates information with
lightning fast speed. New media influences extremism by reinforcing extremist policy, providing easy
access to extremist beliefs and mobilising followers with calls to action. Metadata is more obvious
and more fertile in tweets than in other forms of media, thus the accumulative effect of multiple
retweets, further re‐enforced through hashtags, pictures and URLs, adds to the acceptance,
influence and authority of each message.
Twitter is an ideal vehicle for issuing a ‘call to action’. Many of Wilders’ tweets combine these calls
to action with hashtags and URLs to magnify their perceived significance. Extremist groups can relay
combinational phrases such as #stop Islam repeatedly with a lower expectancy of any message
dilution by means of counter‐narrative. Online political ‘chat rooms’ and Facebook forums allow for
narrative and counter‐narrative to debate and dilute the power of a single message. In contrast,
counter‐narrative dissenters rarely re‐tweet an original narrative for fear of drawing attention to the
original messenger.
7

One unexplained metric remains with those followers who do not re‐tweet, yet retain sufficient
interest to remain as a nominated follower of a given persona. In the case of Geert Wilders there are
more than a quarter of a million followers who remain openly interested in his tweets. With this in
mind the power of the retweet is often underestimated. The ability to count retweets gives a partial
indication of the popularity and support that a narrative captures. That support is considerably
increased by overt metadata such as hashtags and URLs. Followers of right‐wing extremist dogma
through Twitter are exposed to amplified narrative and augmented perceptions of influence.
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